The paper takes the recent conflict and wars in the region of post-Yugoslav states and their impact on women as the point of departure. In this empirical context, I explore the patterns of violence against women, arguing that ethnic nationalism as a social phenomenon engenders a kind of "structural violence" with gender specific implications.
the situation of women in post-Yugoslav countries. My sources include: observations made during fieldwork, in-depth interview data with 18 refugee women from various ethnicnationalities as well as five representatives of women's groups, newspaper articles, papers, newsletters, and journals. The field work was conducted in the Summers of 1994, 1995, 1996. 2 In this respect, the perspective is partial because it arises primarily from an analysis of the recent situation in Serbia and applies to lesser extent to the conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The analysis can also be considered partial because of my own situation, i.e., ethnicnational and personal identity. Thus, for those who may want to question not just the message but the messenger, I will try to place myself. I was born, brought up, and educated in Belgrade, Serbia, where I lived until my "voluntary" exile five years ago, when I went to England and later to Canada in search of "a minimal condition for some kind of democracy of selves" (Cockburn 1997 ). I am a Serb by ethnic origin and have chosen to be a Yugoslav. Most of my memories, experiences, and values, as well as my life politics, arise from the notion of a shared identity with all peoples of a once common country. My relationship to them was not just symbolic. I knew and shared experiences with so many of them. This shared experience determined the sense of difference, which is not pure "otherness". The revival of ethnic-nationalism and the disintegration of a familiar social space disrupted my own sense of belonging and radically displaced me. It left me, I feel, without the option of being either Yugoslav or Serb. On the one hand, the geographical space that is still officially called Yugoslavia is without the essential cultural, political, and social markers with which I identified. On the other, from my own sense of self, it is impossible for me to identify as a Serb, because that would now imply acceptance of the values of "purification", "cleansing" of differences, and the process of exclusion. Thus, the place I am speaking from now, is somewhere in transition. It is a transition to a space where a new identity and new subjectivity can be articulated. 3 Thus, analysis of the impact of the revival of ethnic-nationalism on women in these particular geographical locations acknowledges that there is no "nationalism in general" (Parker, Summer, and Yaeger 1992: 3) . However, the analysis recognizes also "the extraordinary similarities in the ways that very different nationalisms construct 'women,' and their construction of the nation as female" (Pettman 1996: 48) . These similarities in the construction of nation and nationalism through gender are central for the analysis of patterns of violence against women in the various contexts of ethnic-national divisions that have involved or are involving war. In this respect, the paper does not explore the relationship between Serbian aggressive ethnic-nationalist ideology versus more or less defensive ethnic-national identities of other post-Yugoslav nation-states. Nor does it focus on a critique of solely Serbian nationalism as the nationalism of "my own people". 4 Rather, it inquires as to how these highly politicized forms of identity formation manipulate and abuse women.
THE PROBLEM WITH VISIBILITY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
As noted in the introduction, the primary focus on mass rape of predominantly Bosnian
Muslim women in this conflict contributed to an equation of rape with violence against women in these wars. This equation tends to shape the belief, even among abused women, that the violence against them in these wars is solely sexual or physical. Research on "Women, Violence, and War", conducted by Nikolic-Ristanovic, Mrvic-Petrovic, Konstantinovic-Vilic, and
Stevanovic (1995) in Serbia, Montenegro, and the territory of the so-called "Republic Srpska" during 1994 supports my argument. Among 150 interviewed refugee women, a majority denied any personal experience with violence in the war. Yet, later in the interviews, it became clear that this initial response means only that the interviewed women were not the victims of rape in this war. The authors emphasize that women's initial reaction to the topic of violence against women in the war is two-fold (18) (19) . On the one hand, as is generally common among women who are victims of rape, the denial of personal experience of sexual violence in war was an attempt to protect themselves from further victimization. In the case of the interviewed refugee women, this applies even more so, since the social stigma that women victims of rape generally face is more powerful in a context of a deeply patriarchal culture. 5 Yet, on the other hand, Nikolic-Ristanovic, et al.'s interviews revealed that the way many women defined their experience with violence in this war reflected to a great extent the media coverage of the situation of women in the conflict. Both the local and the international media campaigns covering this war, by focusing almost exclusively on rape of women, have contributed to how individual women have negotiated the meanings and definitions of violence against them.
The individual negotiation of women's experiences of violence facilitates the continuum of "structural violence" by transforming the victimized into easily controlled "state subjects".
Feminist critique of the state (Pateman 1988; Pettman 1996) , reveal that all states constitute the "state subject" in a gendered way, and thus citizenship is essentially a male project. Ethnicnationalism, militarization, and the various forms of gendered violence they evolve are the ways of maintaining and perpetrating this essential gender inequality within the state project. These issues have theoretical and political implications for both feminist scholarship and women's movements in their efforts to uncover "gendered workings of power" that are commonly transformed into violence against women (Enloe 1993: 246) . By articulating their personal experiences with violence, in their own ways, women can make an effort to avoid male terminology, hence deconstructing man as the center of a discourse (Lerner 1986 ). Lerner argues that it is women who change, re-produce, and transform beliefs and practice in order to create a new, shared, and gender free language, and thereby, I would add, a society. If women are to gain agency and control over their lives, then a matrix of their social space needs to be one where the "state subject" is constituted in the image of both woman and man. This transformation is particularly important in an historic moment when struggles over seemingly unambiguous ethnic-national divisions, or between competing religious movements, are becoming increasingly important. If women are to stand up and speak for themselves as women and as representatives of their ethnic-nations and their respective states-in-the-making, then the patterns of "structural violence" that are embedded in these processes have to be named, defined, and theorized.
POLITICAL CONTEXT: ETHNIC-NATIONALISM AND WOMEN IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION
A comprehensive analysis of the origins and history of the recent conflict in the postYugoslav countries is not within the scope of this paper, yet it is important to note briefly the main characteristics of their recent political context. This will allow an analysis of the effects of ethnic nationalism on women in the region within a broader economic, social, and political context.
Violent conflict in the region has been desicribed to a large extent as a struggle caused by historical animosities and hatred among peoples in the region. However, recent studies (Denitch 1994; Woodward 1995) on the historical, social, and political context of Yugoslavia that led to its violent disintegration demonstrate that the conflict is "the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy" (Woodward 1995: 15) .
This process of transition to democracy has failed as a result of political action that, according to Woodward,
[D]id not focus on transforming the rights of the socialist system to rights associated with private property, free enterprise, civil rights, and competitive political regimes, but on national sovereignty (336).
A crucial point in this failure "was economic decline, caused largely by a program intended to resolve a foreign debt crisis" (15) . The result of the failure has been ethnic-national pluralization, which has taken on an extreme nationalistic and chauvinistic form in almost all of the former republics within the region. The society faced a plurality of nationalistic ideologies and projects, rather than ethnic or national pluralism, and the resulting conflict of ethnic-national identities has overshadowed all kinds of problems and conflict in the society, such as: economic crisis, social instability caused by regionally uneven development, and underdeveloped and/or non-existent elements of civil society.
The political and social events of the late 1980s that brought state socialism to its end were characterized by the complete rejection of the state socialist experience and implied both a loss of societal identity and a certain degree of disorientation with regard to the future. The conjunction of these processes with a deep economic crisis resulted in growing social unease.
The economic crisis showed its alarming signs during the 1980s, as a result of the cumulative effect of hidden errors in the system. Incompetent and radical structural economic reforms produced a drastic fall of the GNP in 1989 (three years prior to the beginning of the war) at an average yearly rate of 18.7 percent. 6 Due to the ongoing economic crisis and restructuring, women's employment rates were declining. Even before the "transition to democracy" and the war in post-Yugoslav countries, employed women accounted for only a minority of the adult female population, around one-third in most areas, and nowhere greater than 40 percent. Consequently, the majority of women, the remaining other two-thirds, had to be content with a marginal and dependent status (Milic 1994 The scope of the economic crisis tangibly affected people's lives, and the trends were visible and demoralizing. Because ethnic nationalism, deeply concerned with an idealized past, had the power to give millions of people a sense of security, it was a supremely effective response to the difficulties a society had to face in a time of political, economic, and social turmoil. The ideology of ethnic nationalism proffered a traditional set of "natural" valuesreligion, tradition, "common blood" and kin -which could serve as a source of social stability.
Nationalistic (male)leadership 8 claimed that only something as "unnatural" as a socialist, communist regime would have dared to destroy these values.
The predominant concern of ethnic-national ideologies with a struggle for cultural and religious "authenticity" involves assigning to women the roles and responsibilities for the reproduction of the group and for the custody of cultural values and cultural identity. In this respect, contemporary ethnic-national projects and their struggles in post-Yugoslav countries represent a revival and celebration of traditional gender codes and male power. These roles become the role models for a "new" nationalist family. Any notions of women's emancipation developed during the state socialist regime (e.g., better access to education, equal opportunities in employment, the legal right to equal pay, liberal abortion rights, etc.) were, thus, demonized. In Croatia, in yet another example, the Government has published a "Concept of Demographic
Restoration", with the intent of transforming the present family into the "family of the Croatian future" (Kesic 1995) . Its pro-life orientation is justified by a similar anti-communist discourse:
(for the) struggle against the anti-life mentality it is necessary to immediately purge all the misconceptions and propaganda...from the laws of the times of communist single-mindedness (37).
Ethnic-nationalism, thus, has transformed women into "honored" relics in the collective act of social or ethnic-national "rescue".
The outcomes of this social reconstruction were the roles of the "patriotic father" and the "patriotic mother" of the ethnic-nation. These opposing yet complementary roles erased virtually all other conceivable social identifiers, and became the roles in which "masculine" men and "feminine" women were expected to act.
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PATRIOTIC MOTHERS: REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION-
STATE
The "masculine" men are to destroy or kill the opposing ethnic-nation in order to "protect" "their" women, children, land, and the "honourable histories" of their "patriotic fathers". The "feminine" women are to reproduce/give-birth to children, the followers of their "patriotic" fathers in the name of "sacred" ethnic-national collectives. Consequently, through the mechanism of a nation-state, policies are developed that encourage the population growth of the "right kind" in the name of "national security". 12 The birth rate became a question of national military defense.
A concern for the "national security" of "endangered" ethnic-nations has its ideological and practical consequences for women and their status in post-Yugoslav countries. In October 1992, for example, a document on demographic problems in Serbia was published. 13 Entitled "Warning" and signed by several important public and "national institutions", this document called for the foundation of a State Council for Population Dynamics which, according to its authors (nine men), should be chaired by President Milosevic himself.
The authors' primary concern is "a lack of balance" in the growth rates of certain nations, minorities, and ethnic groups in Serbia, with an emphasis on how the Serbian nation is "endangered" by high birth rates among Albanians, Muslims and Gypsies "which deviates from rational and human procreation" (sic) (Cetkovic 1993: 84) . The problem with this document, as Papic (1995) notes, is not that it imposes the dual principle of stimulation/suppression of birth rate differences between the ethnic-national groups, but that the document explains these differences in a vary dangerous way. The differences are seen not as a consequence of social and economic conditions (i.e., the region of Kosova is one of the most underdeveloped parts of the region; 95 percent of Albanian women are unemployed), but rather as being political or naturalist in character (i.e., the high birth rate in Kosova is the long term political strategy of Albanians to outgrow the Serbian nation, and/or they are "so primitive" because of their "natural" and unchangeable ethnic mentality) (Papic 1995: 41) .
The logical next step in redressing these population concerns was to tighten the rights to abortion. After calls, in early 1993 and early 1994, by the Serbian Orthodox Church for the prohibition of abortion, in May 1995, the Serbian Parliament passed a new, restrictive law on family planning. The law does not allow personal, family, or social reasons for an abortion between the tenth and twentieth weeks of pregnancy.
In Croatia, in June 1993, following the pro-natal spirit of the Concept of Demographic
Restoration, the Croatian Population Movement was founded. Its participants, males mostly over 60, accepted a program that recommends, among other goals: 1) the need to emphasize that the father of a Croatian family is the fundamental linchpin of the demographic restoration of Croatia, and therefore is responsible for the prosperity and happiness of the family; and 2) the stopping of the quiet exodus of young Croatian women (Kesic 1995: 37) .
These events clearly demonstrate an alarming sign of states' intention to control women.
They became a prologue to a strategy of militarization in politics and everyday life. When women are seen predominantly as the means for renewing the nation, they become crucial for "national security", and their bodies are defined by its militarized strategies. Thus, women's task is to use their bodies as "incubators for descendants in a war against the bodies of other women", namely, women of a different ethnic-national background (Papic 1995: 41) .
NATIONALISTIC POLITICS OF EXCLUSION AND 'ETHNIC CLEANSING' -GENDER

IMPLICATIONS
Current ethnic-national projects in the region are based on politics and practices of exclusion. Leadership in the new nation-states has insisted on struggles around an ideology of ethnic-national identity that seeks purification and ethnic-national "sameness" because these struggles are an effective means of maintaining political power. Thus, their existence is violently denied.
In the Yugoslav context, where most communities were ethnically mixed (Petrovic 1985: 29-61; Woodward 1995: 33-35) , the politics of exclusion was critical for ethnic-national elites and their claim to power. Multi-ethnic communities were not just the sites of peaceful multiethnic co-existence but also of cohesion. Mixed marriages were one of the significant demographic and cultural characteristics of the Yugoslav society. They were both a prerequisite and a consequence of a quite considerable history of peaceful multi-ethnic relationships.
Approximately two million people in the region are either parents in or children of ethnically mixed marriages. At the time of the 1981 census, they outnumbered Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims, and Slovenes, and were themselves outnumbered only by Croats and Serbs (Petrovic 1985 ). Yet, nationalist propaganda in Serbia today calls mixed marriages "bastard factories" that are polluting "the biological national source of family." 15 In The mobilization of the ideology of biological, spiritual, and cultural "cleansing" was a precursor to war. Nationalistic oligarchies actively worked to spread hatred and fear of an "other," creating a base for an ethnic-national identity that would be suitable for their projects of ethnically singular and fundamentalist states. 16 History and language were to be altered and purified of any notion of peaceful co-existence. The names of streets and cities were to be stripped of every reminder that a given ethnic-nation lived with "others."
The most radical version of the ideologies of purification has become "ethnic cleansing." 17 Even those who doubted in 1991, at the beginning of the war in Croatia, that "ethnic cleansing" was planned now perceive after the war in the region that this was its main goal. The heaviest fighting took place in areas with the most mixed populations: in BosniaHerzegovina and Croatia. Territorial cleansing in war-zones was followed by cleansing in those areas unaffected by the war. As a result of that practice (read: "politics") of the ethnicnationalists, 4.5 to 5 million people in the region had been "cleansed" by August 1995. The data include refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as approximately 700,000 people who left the country in the last couple of years seeking political asylum in European countries. 18 When we note that the total population before the war was 22 million, these figures mean that every fourth or fifth citizen of what once was Yugoslavia has been "ethnically cleansed." 19 A large majority -over 70 percent in some post-Yugoslav states -were women (USCR, 1993a).
Instances of women becoming "special targets" in conflict and war zones are not new. However, in the context of the new nation-state building in the region of the former Yugoslavia, it has a specific meaning. This massive gendered population transfer within the region has operated as a crucial symbolic as well as material element in (re)constructing boundaries between ethnicnational collectives.
Within a situation of violent conflict over ethnically homogeneous territories and states, as discussed elsewhere, uprooted women have become symbolically and strategically important for the destruction of the community of the opposed ethnic-national collective(Korac in press-a).
The role women play in this process is intrinsically related to the women's roles in producing and reproducing ethnic-national collectives and their ideologies. As several studies have already pointed out, the roles of women include their activities as biological and cultural reproducers of their ethnic-national collective; as cultural embodiments of collectives and their boundaries; and as participants in ethnic-national struggles (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Walby 1992; Brah 1993; Yuval-Davis 1993) . Moreover, as Copelon (1994: 207) As I have stated elsewhere, most men are practically pushed and made to become violent (Korac 1993: 110) . Due to such pressures they have started to kill each other on the battlefield. They have started to rape and kill their enemies -wives, daughters, sisters and mothers. Yet behind the uncomprehensibly brutal images of war and its male perpetrators, inhumanity and destruction rage as a plague throughout post-Yugoslav countries. There are many thousands of tragic examples of men psychologically destroyed by having to take part in this war, and to give themselves up to violence and hate, to prove themselves as "good" representatives of their people and nation, patriots, and above all, "real men", men with "guts."
Militarization of ethnic-national collectives is the central point for an aggressive ethnicnational project. Thus, it is crucial for its leadership to create a "real warrior" who is capable of fighting "sacred" ethnic-national wars. The centrality of this issue for nationalistic propaganda is a paradoxical one. As Papic (1994: 14) explains, during fifty years of peace, the traditional/patriarchal masculine identity has changed, under the influence of urbanizing transformations. 21 It has become more complex, tolerant, urban-like, and "softer", as well as less eager or even not interested to seek revenge for all the past tragic losses. It takes time, a lot of manipulation, and war propaganda to (re)create "national enemies" and a paranoia within ethnicnational collectives. 22 This was necessary in order to create a "real man," a "patriot" who would fight back in "defence" against "the eternal enemy" of his ethnic-national collective.
In this respect, it can be argued that ethnic-national mobilization of a collective is a process crucially related to both women's and men's boundness to their traditionally defined gender roles. The critical element of a chauvinistic ethnic-national ideology is violence embodied in militant masculinity. Violence oriented masculinity has become the main means of recruiting individuals who are capable of committing war-related atrocities because their militant collective is the ultimate judge of what is good and evil. The counter-balance for such a violence oriented masculinity has been emotional, committed, supportive but passive, femininity.
These two roles and the notions related to them have overwhelmed women with fear and uncertainty, under the burden of sole responsibility for their families and with no imaginable future or vision. This may not be readily visible violence, yet, it is still all-encompassing and devastating.
PLACE OF EXILE AS A WAR ZONE
Conflicts and wars induced by an ethnic-nationalism that insists on an ideology of "sameness" and hatred for an "other," as in the case of the region that once was Yugoslavia, produce an additional set of individual, social and political problems for the region's population, and especially for those who are displaced and in exile. Millions of refugees and internally displaced persons now confront the problem of reconciling their own conception of belonging and identity with the new realities of their lives. Once they had the fortune to escape immediate life threatening dangers, refugees found themselves in familiar places of refuge, where their friends, colleagues, lovers, and family might have lived. However, even though the refugees knew the local language and customs, they became "foreigners in a country which until recently was their homeland" (Nikolic-Ristanovic et. al. 1995: 13) . They are perceived, in a word, as strangers.
Refugees from war-torn zones live in ethnically mixed refugee camps in newly recognized states, where their ethnic-national group differs from the majority of the population.
These refugees are frequently perceived as "enemies." The experience of a Bosnian Muslim refugee woman whom I interviewed demonstrates a continuum of stress and fear she has to deal with while in exile.
And then I went to the Red Cross, because I didn't dare go and register with the High Commissioner's office; I was afraid that they'd put me, a Muslim, in collective accommodation. I was afraid for my children.
... I'm in an environment
[a collective accommodation for women and children with special needs] where the women are traumatized, they have lost their husbands, children, their husbands are at the front. They take sides, they are nationally oriented, committed; when they listen to the news they comment, they support these stands .... One of the women said to me: But you're in Serbia, you must support this here.
In other words I have to support this politics, such as it is. I don't support it, not any one of them....
The experience of a second Bosnian Muslim refugee woman reveals an individual strategy that refugee women from non-Serbian ethnic-national backgrounds commonly use in their struggle to survive in a hostile environment:
I only had some minor problems with a woman here (she moved out recently) Women refugees from minority nationalities tend not to initiate discussion on sensitive political issues. Given the context of their flight, as stated elsewhere (Korac, in press-a) , their very presence represents a "grave breach" of the aggressive Serbian nationalist cause for war. They have to be silent and suppress their political views and beliefs, unless absolutely necessary, and they tend to make themselves "invisible." This "strategy of silence" is a common strategy of women's resistance to "gendered workings of power" (Enloe 1993: 246) in "a time called peace."
However, as social and political power shifts radically, this strategy becomes a central form of resistance both between and within genders. When it is deployed as a form of resistance within genders, the "strategy of silence" engenders further restrictions regarding the "social space" women are permitted. Consequently, fear endures and a real problem remains in dealing with a collective to which these women represent a demonized ethnic-national group. In this respect, the place of exile carries the characteristics of a war zone.
Additionally, as a result of war, the economic crisis worsened. This transformed all refugees, regardless of their ethnicity, into "others" perceived as a heavy and unbearable imposition by host governments. A Serbian refugee woman from Bosnia & Herzegovina explains this experience:
...it seemed like the refugees had eaten everything, taken everything. As if it was our fault the war started over there....
Deterioration of the economy, nationalistic propaganda fueling hatred toward the "other," militarization, and war, have together contributed to a situation where boundaries blurred. But who is the "other?"
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE AGAINST AN ETERNAL "OTHER" Local women's groups report (Mladjenovic 1993a: 54-56; Mladjenovic 1993b: 94; Stanojevic 1994 : 51-52) a significant increase in domestic violence as a result of wars and conflicts in the region. Hotlines in both Belgrade and Zagreb have reported that in the winter of 1991-92, about fifteen percent of the calls were related to post-war violence (Mladjenovic 1993a) . Men who have returned from the frontlines continue to be violent in their homes. As Mladjenovic (1995: 6) argues, "woman constitutes a 'minority group' in the family, and thus becomes the Other who has to be controlled."
Ethnic-national ideologies and projects justify violence as the "defence" of the "endangered" ethnic-national collective. This strategy gives "freedom" to the suppressed need for violence, and once Pandora's box is open, violence is everywhere, on the battlefield, in politics, on the street, at home, in the bedroom (Korac 1993: 110) . The nationalist hatred generated in the process of ethnic-national revival requires a target on which to act out those feelings. As Mrsevic and Hughes point out in their analysis of the situation in Serbia:
In the autumn of 1991, the SOS Hotline started receiving calls from women who were battered after men watched the TV news (or special broadcasts) in which pictures of dead bodies were shown. The narratives were filled with hatred for "the enemy." Women reported that men became enraged after watching the nationalist propaganda and they beat women as a way to avenge their wounded national pride. Some women reported that they were beaten for the first time in their lives after the men watched one of the nationalist reports on Serbian victims of war (1997: 120).
Women in ethnically mixed marriages confront an additional kind of victimization and horror at home. According to reports of the local women's groups working with women and children victims of violence, there is an increase in domestic violence within ethnically-mixed households as a result of the war and ethnic-national tensions (Stanojevic 1993) . As one woman, whose husband physically abused her reveals: "He beats me up because I am Albanian, and my parents do not want to see me because I married a Serb" (Zajovic 1994: 65) . Thus, ethnic hatred becomes yet another argument for men to justify physical violence against women. This type of violence is often accompanied by rejection on the part of the woman's family, creating a situation where victimized women suffer even more. The ideology of ethnic-national purification and "cleansing" extends easily, and with disquieting internal logic, to "one's own woman" as well as to women's bodies in general.
RAPE IN WAR: A TOOL IN (MEN'S) CONSTRUCTION OF THE ETHNIC-NATIONAL CAUSE
As women are seen as precious property of the "enemy", their bodies become territories to be seized and conquered. Rape in war, and in ethnic-national war in particular, becomes a powerful symbolic weapon against the "enemy." In addition, rape is an effective implement of territorial "cleansing," for men will not return to the places where they have been "humiliated"
by the rape of "their" women.
The very logic of rape as a tool in the strategy of "ethnic-cleansing," as Meznaric (1994: 79) explains, rests upon "the use of gender as a means to control communication and to sharpen the boundaries between two opposed ethnicities." The rape of women of the opposed ethnic collective carries an important symbolic message from men to men. As Seifert (1994: 58) points out, it communicates to men that they have been unable to protect "their" women. The symbolic outcome of sexual aggression towards women in war is that men are wounded in their masculinity and marked as "incompetent" (ibid.: 58). This in turn, I would add, functions as an important mobilizing element in further militarizing ethnic-national collectives.
Furthermore, when a woman has been raped in this war, her womb and body are considered as an "occupied" territory. This becomes an important feature in the political propaganda of nationalists as local governments and politicians, supported by local and international media, provide incomplete, one-sided information about wartime rape. Reports focus almost exclusively on the crimes of the "other" side, so that the ethnic-national membership of the rapist and of a possibly foetus become the focal point, dismissing both the raped woman and the crime committed against her.
THE NATION-STATE, RAPE, AND FEMINISM(S)
As Benderly (1997: 65) ...the idea of France as a woman raped became part of the repertoire of propagandists....The evolution of imagery to fit the war's development and triumphant end explains in part the virtual amnesia which later consigned the whole story of rape and the child of the barbarian to oblivion....
If we look at a more recent historic example of mass sexual victimization of women in Bangladesh, it becomes clear that part of the reason assaulted women received international attention was "[t]he desperate need of Sheik Mujibur Rahman's government for international sympathy and financial aid." (Brownmiller 1975: 86) .
In the case of mass rape in Bosnia & Herzegovina, the state representatives has sued Serbia at the International court of Justice for genocide, including rape. This move of the Bosnian government is regarded by some feminists as an outstanding gesture on the part of a state. These feminists argue that Bosnian state stood up for women's rights "in a way that no state ever has" (MacKinnon 1994: 194) , claiming that this event has a potential to restructure radically restructure "international rules of war" and human rights conventions.
I would argue, however, that it would be hard to expect that the rights of victimized women in these wars can be protected by the "shield" of the new nation-states in the region. The As a result of these politics, "women's groups from various republics built up a long-term cooperative relationship that endured longer than the Yugoslav federation." (ibid.: 70). However, the network of women across the region did not remain untouched. Nationalism brought about internal tensions, crisis, and separation within and among some local women's groups, because some women felt they could not engage in anti-nationalist and anti-war politics while their nation was "endangered." Nevertheless, the anti-nationalist politics of the remaining local women's groups did help thousands of refugees, and refugee women in particular, through multiethnic self help groups and other programs they organized. If we look closely at the kind of "protection" that has already been given to women survivors of massive sexual atrocities in these wars, such "protection" actually turns out to be '(1995: 33) .
"Disloyal" local women's groups reacted quite rapidly to the danger of further victimization of women survivors of rape in these wars. The CWWV from Zagreb, for example, stated in a Letter of Intentions forwarded to women's and peace organizations worldwide:
We are writing this letter because we fear that the process of helping raped women is turning in a strange direction, being taken over by governmental institutions. Ministry of Health of Croatia, and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and male gynaecologists in particular (sic). We fear that the raped women could be used in political propaganda with the aim of spreading hatred and revenge, thus leading to further violence against women and to further victimization of survivors.
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Women's organizations worldwide have responded by gathering humanitarian aid, sending money, by lobbying their governments to set up an international war crimes tribunal and working to change international conventions. Although this response showed a certain solidarity, it was not without its internal tensions. Some U.S. feminists (U.S. feminist attorney C.
MacKinnon, for example), argue "that rape is a distinctly Serbian weapon for which all Serbseven feminists who oppose war -are culpable" (Benderly 1997: 67) . 28 Consequently the support given to the "disloyal" local women's groups was not entirely unambiguous.
Nor was the process of attaining an effective prosecution of gender-based crimes in the former Yugoslavia problem-free. Copelon, Gaer, and Green (1995) Therefore, the support and lobbying is best described as a pale light in an endless tunnel of victimization and violence against women.
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this paper reveals the patterns of gendered violence in a social and political context of militarization, conflict, and war over ethnic-national "purity" and "sameness" This discussion is not, by any means, to be understood as an approach that neglects men's experience of violence in war or their victimization by ethnic-national discourses and politics.
Nonetheless, as argued in this paper, there is a difference between women's and men's experience of violence in war. Men predominantly control economic and military resources. Consequently, men have a more active role in war and as a rule most often enter history as victors.
This analysis of patterns of violence against women in the wars in some post-Yugoslav countries has attempted to synthesize the usually fragmented analyses of the situation of women in the region. The discussion has argued for a feminist effort, both theoretically and politically, to uncover "gendered workings of power" (Enloe 1993 ) within a post-communist process of nation-state building. Furthermore, if the wars in post-Yugoslav countries are to be taken as a terrifying but fundamental lesson on violence and crimes against women, we must bring to the surface the different patterns of violence against women within the context of ethnic-national strategies. Only the success of that effort will acknowledge violence against women in a fundamental way.
NOTES
Maja Korac
Center University.
1.
The usage of "structural violence"here is that defined by Galtung, who refers to "structural violence"as the type of violence that is "built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life choices...." (Galtung 1969:171-172 ).
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Mazowiecki defines "ethnic-cleansing" as "the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over given territory of members of other groups." (Kaldor, 1993: 108) . The methods range from various forms of economic and social pressure and discrimination to killing, raping, and other forms of horrific crimes committed in these wars.
18.
The data derive from UNHCR report, July 1995, as well as the latest instances of "ethnic cleansing" in Srebrenica and Zepa (Bosnia & Herzegovina) and in the region of Krajina (Croatia) (Nasa Borba, 1995) .
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